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EXTRADITING MEXICAN NATIONALS IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CRIMES
Joshua S. Spector*
In recent years, Mexican narcotics trafficking has become a major
threat to the security of the Americas. Mexican narco-traffickers have
used their wealth and violence to corrupt political and judicial
systems and avoid effective prosecution or penalty in Mexican courts.
Historically, Mexico has refused to extradite its nationals in reliance
on Mexican law prohibiting the extradition of nationals in all but
"exceptional" case& This Note argues that Mexico should take a step
toward controlling the cross-border narcotics trade and recognize
international drug trafficking as an 'exceptional"crime. Upon recogniz-
ing narcotics crimes as 'exceptional," Mexico should then begin
extraditing Mexican narco-traffickers to the United States.
INTRODUCTION
On September 24, 1997, U.S. law enforcement officials
placed Ram6n Eduardo Arellano F6lix, a Mexican citizen, on
the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List.1 The State Department and
the FBI have offered over two million dollars in reward money
for his capture Ram6n Arellano and his brothers are the
leaders of the Arellano F6lix Organization (AFO), a drug cartel
based in Tijuana, Mexico.3 FBI Director Louis J. Freeh has
called the AFO "the most vicious, ruthless criminal organiza-
tion involved in smuggling drugs into the United States."
Thomas A. Constantine, head of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA), said the cartel is "one of the most
powerful organized crime syndicates in the world today."5
* Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 32, 1998.
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The cartel is well known for high-volume trafficking of co-
caine, marijuana, and methamphetamines,s and for violence
throughout Mexico and Southern California, including the
murders of police officers, prosecutors, and members of rival
drug cartels.7 A sealed indictment in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California in San Diego charges
Ram6n Arellano with conspiring to smuggle cocaine and
marijuana into the United States.8 At the time of this writing,
his whereabouts are officially unknown to U.S. and Mexican
officials.9 However, unofficial reports continue to place Arel-
lano in Mexico, living the extravagant lifestyle to which he and
his cartel members have grown accustomed.'0 Reports from
Mexico state that the Arellano brothers are popular and
prominent in Mexican social circles." They frequent bars and
discos in the wealthy areas of Tijuana. 2 It is widely rumored
that they have no worries about capture or prosecution. People
are too scared to report them to the police, because the cartel
controls the police throughout Baja California.' In addition,
Arellano has a reputation for violence and is protected by the
AFO's heavily-armed, trained security force." Even if Ram6n
Arellano were captured by Mexican law enforcement, Mexico's
legal prohibition of the extradition of nationals stands in the
way of an effective prosecution of Mexican citizens such as the
leader of this ruthless cartel."'
6. See id.; Gregory Gross, Glitz, Violence Mark Cartel Leader's Path, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRm., Sept. 25, 1997, at Al.
7. See Stern & Walker, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See id.




14. See id.; Donnie Marshall, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, United States Department of Justice, Prepared Statement Before the
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice (Mar. 18, 1998), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File [hereinafter Marshall Statement].
15. The Mexican Executive has interpreted Mexican extradition law to establish
a de facto prohibition on the extradition of its nationals. See Ley de Extradicion Inter-
nacional (Dec. 29, 1975) [hereinafter Mexican International Extradition Law]; Alan D.
Bersin, El Tercer Pais: Reinventing the US. IMexico Border, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1413,
1419 n.7 (1996). On its face, the law allows the extradition of nationals in
"exceptional" cases: "Ningtin mexicano podrd ser entregado a un Estado extranjero,
sino en casos excepcionales a juicio del Ejecutivo. [No Mexican shall be extradited to a
foreign state, except in exceptional cases as judged by the Executive.]" Mexican Inter-
national Extradition Law, supra, at art. 14. However, the Mexican Executive has
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During the weekend of November 8, 1997, Mexican police
arrested Arturo Piez Martinez, a suspected Mexican cocaine
smuggler and a reputed member of the AFO, in Tijuana."8 Two
days later an indictment was unsealed in San Diego, charging,
Pdez with conspiracy to distribute more than 2,200 pounds of
cocaine in the United States." The United States would like to
prosecute Piez, who is thought to be a member of the ten-man
"board of directors" of the AFO and one of the most powerful
members of the cartel. s The arrest and conviction of Pdez
would aid the effort to dismantle the Arellano organization. 9
The U.S. government requested the extradition of Pdez, but in
April 1998, a Mexican judge denied the request on the grounds
that Pez is a Mexican citizen.20 Despite the judicial rejection
of the extradition petition, the Mexican Foreign Ministry can
still approve the extradition. 2' Because Pdez, like the uncap-
tured Ram6n Arellano, is a Mexican citizen, he is shielded by
Mexican law and Mexican resistance to American pressure.22
In early 1997, American officials in the State Department
gave their Mexican counterparts an extradition "wish list"
comprised of 20 suspected Mexican drug traffickers. 23 None of
these international fugitives have been extradited.24
never recognized the case of a Mexican national as an "exceptional" one warranting
extradition to the United States. See discussion infra Part III.B.
16. See Tim Golden, Drug Case in Mexico Tests Pact with US., N.Y TIMES, Nov.




20. See Gregory Gross, Mexican Judge Rejects Extradition Bid, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Apr. 27, 1998, at B1.
21. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 30.
22. See id.; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
23. See Golden, supra note 16.
24. See id. In 1997, ten Mexican nationals were certified for extradition to the
United States, five of whom are wanted for drug-related offenses. See Bureau for Int'l
Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. State Dep't, International Narcotics Con-
trol Strategy Report, 1997: Continuation of Canada, Mexico and Central America-
Mexico (released Mar. 1998, visited Oct. 14, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/
narcoticslaw/1997_narc-reportcamex97_part2.html> [hereinafter Strategy Report].
Certification refers to the judicial determination that an individual may be extradited.
In both the United States and Mexico, the judiciary determines whether or not to
grant extradition, but the executive makes the final determination. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1994); Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradi-
tion and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and
Beyond the Rio Grande's Winding Courses, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 519, 541
(1997). Each fugitive has appealed the extradition order. See Strategy Report, supra.
The individual certified for extradition has recourse under Mexican law to challenge
the extradition order through an amparo demand. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra, at
546. The defendant can raise an amparo demand [requesting favor, aid, or protection]
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Nearly ten years ago, in February 1989, representatives
from the United States and Mexico signed the Agreement on
Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug
Dependency25 in Mexico City. In the agreement, Mexican and
American officials pledged to work together to fight the inter-
national narcotics "phenomena" that pose a threat to the
"security and the essential interests of each of the Parties."26
The countries acknowledge that narcotics trafficking and drug
dependency have serious deleterious effects on the people of
both nations.2 7 The agreement's goal is "achieving better coop-
eration" in the struggle against drug production, trafficking,
and use.2" The agreement lists some ways in which the U.S.
and Mexico will cooperate to combat narcotics trafficking.
29
Goals include reducing the demand for and cultivation of ille-
gal drugs, exchanging information between the countries, and
assigning more resources to the fight against drugs.0 Although
not mentioned in the Agreement, extradition is another impor-
tant way that the U.S. and Mexico can cooperate in the fight
against international narcotic crimes.31
Mexico is the second largest trading partner of the United
States.32 In the interest of free and efficient trade, the southern
border of the U.S. is a relatively open passageway.33 An unfor-
tunate by-product of the open border is that it has become the
main port of entry for illegal drugs to the United States.3'
Mexico and the U.S. must work together to maintain free trade
while stemming the flow of drugs from Mexico.35 Alan Bersin,
in order to ask a higher court to examine the final findings or decisions of his case or
to raise constitutional issues. See id. at 547-48. Included among those appealing ex-
tradition in Mexico is Oscar Malherbe, an alleged lieutenant and hit man for Juan
Garcia Abrego's Gulf cartel, who was arrested by Mexican law enforcement in Febru-
ary of 1997. See Strategy Report, supra; James F. Smith, Mexico Highlights its Anti-
Drug Successes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at A6. Also certified for extradition are four
other notorious drug traffickers: Jaime Ladino Avila, Juan Angel Salinas, Tirzo Angel
Robles, and Jaime Gonzalez Castro. See Strategy Report, supra.
25. Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug
Dependency, Feb. 23, 1989, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 11,604 (effective July 30, 1990).
26. Id. at preamble.
27. See id.
28. Id. at art. 11(i).
29. See id. at art. II.
30. See id.
31. Cf M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 4 (3d ed. 1996) (noting extradition's evolution "into an international
means of cooperation in the suppression of criminality").
32. See Bersin, supra note 15, at 1417.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1416.
35. See id. at 1417-18.
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former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California,
emphasized in May 1996 that the United States and Mexico
must acknowledge that drug trafficking is a binational crime
that poses a threat to the security of the Americas as a whole
and to the continental benefits that arise from cooperation in
trade. 6
Mexico has begun to professionalize and modernize its law
enforcement and to create a more effective judicial and penal
system. 7 Corruption runs deep in Mexican society, however,
and it will be many years before the Mexican system is able to
operate without its influence." When Mexico becomes capable
of apprehending and prosecuting the key figures in the traf-
ficking of narcotics into the United States, the United States
should not interfere. Until that time, however, cooperation be-
tween the United States and Mexico in fighting drug
trafficking is key to the success of any war on drugs staged in
the Western Hemisphere.39
This Note suggests that Mexico should extradite Mexican-
national narco-traffickers high on the U.S. extradition request
list.40 The extradition would be in the name of joint security
and cooperation and would serve as a sign that Mexico wants
to cooperate with the United States in fighting drug traffick-
ing at its source. Mexico's law of extradition, combined with a
refusal to acknowledge the magnitude of international drug
trafficking, has effectively prevented the extradition of any
Mexican national to any foreign country.41 This Note suggests
that it is time for Mexico to either recognize that international
drug trafficking is an "exceptional" crime or to change the
Mexican International Extradition Law.
Part I of the Note discusses the current extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico. Part II covers the his-
tory of extradition, U.S. extradition procedure, and the
36. See id. at 1418-19.
37. See Strategy Report, supra note 24; see also infra Part IV (discussing the re-
building of Mexico's primary anti-narcotics enforcement agency).
38. See Strategy Report, supra note 24.
39. See Bersin, supra note 15.
40. One definition of extradition can be found in CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY,
TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY: A
COMPARATiVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE, ROLE, AND IMPACT IN
MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND EXTRADITION 171 (1992):
"Extradition is the international judicial rendition of fugitives charged with an extra-
ditable offense and sought for trial, or already convicted and sought for punishment."
41. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 14; discus-
sion infra Parts III.B, IV.
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jurisdiction under which the United States can prosecute a
Mexican drug trafficker. Part III discusses problems tradition-
ally associated with extradition requests for foreign nationals.
In addition, Part III details U.S. beliefs about the extradition
of nationals and explains Mexico's hesitation to extradite a na-
tional drug trafficker. Part IV proposes that Mexico should
either recognize that the extradition of a Mexican drug traf-
ficker fits within the constitutional exception for the
extradition of nationals in "exceptional" cases or reform its ex-
tradition policy to allow the extradition of a Mexican drug
trafficker to the United States.42
I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S.-MExICO
EXTRADITION TREATY
The current United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty took
effect on January 25, 1980.4' The Treaty establishes an obliga-
tion to extradite for offenses committed outside the territory of
the requested state when: (1) the requested state's laws pro-
vide for the punishment of such an offense committed in the
same circumstances; or (2) when the subject of the request is a
national of the requesting state." The crime must be punish-
able by both states, with a deprivation of liberty for no less
42. This Note does not claim that one extradition, or even a series of extradi-
tions, by Mexico would successfully eradicate narcotics-associated problems in North
America. Nor does this Note mean to suggest that the relative failure of the fight
against drugs in the Americas rests entirely on Mexican shoulders. The United States
also has far to go on many fronts, such as reducing demand for, and increasing educa-
tion about, illegal drugs. See Bersin, supra note 15, at 1418-19. Still, an explicit and
tangible sign of the joint effort intended by the 1989 agreement, such as a binational
effort culminating in the prosecution of a Mexican narco-trafficker in a U.S. federal
court, would be an important signal to Mexican drug traffickers that the immunity
they currently enjoy is ending.
43. See Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 US.T. 5059, 5059-60
[hereinafter US.-Mex. Extradition Treaty].
44. See id. at art. 1(2). The dual criminality requirement ensures that an indi-
vidual will not be extradited unless the "'alleged criminal conduct is considered
criminal under the laws of both the surrendering and requesting nations.'" Clarey v.
Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 765 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S. v. Saccoccia, 18 F.3d 795, 800 n.6
(9th Cir. 1994)). US. federal courts have interpreted the requirement to mean that the
laws of the two countries are directed at the same category of conduct, regardless of
whether the name of the crime or the scope of liability is necessarily the same. See id.
at 765-66 (holding that although the Mexican charge of "simple homicide" criminal-
izes a "broader range of conduct than does the United States felony murder statute,"
the dual criminality requirement was met because the criminal conduct for which the
defendant was charged also satisfied the elements of felony murder under US. law).
Extraditing Mexican Nationals
than one year.4 The Treaty lists thirty-one crimes for which
extradition is authorized." It authorizes extradition for the
commission of an offense as well as for attempts and conspira-
cies to commit an offense.47 The Treaty prohibits extradition of
the person sought when the requested state has already prose-
cuted, acquitted, or convicted her for the same offense." It also
allows either state to refuse extradition when the offense is
punishable by death in the requesting state but is not punish-
able by death in the requested state."9 Alternatively, the treaty
allows the requested state to extract assurances from the re-
questing nation that the death penalty will not be imposed if
extradition is granted. 0
The Treaty specifically addresses the problem posed by re-
quests to extradite nationals. Article 9 states: "Neither
Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nation-
als, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if
not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to de-
liver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so."5'
If the reqgested state refuses an extradition request under the
nationals exemption, the Treaty requires that it prosecute the
subject of the request itself.52
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXTRADITION
As early as the sixteenth century, political theorists recog-
nized the benefit of international obligations ensuring that one
nation would not act as a safe haven for a fugitive from an-
other state.53 Emerich de Vattel believed in the existence of a
"natural law" duty to extradite fugitives accused of a serious
crime from other states.' Other theorists asserted the existence
45. See US.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 2(1).
46. See id. at app.
47. See id. at art. 2(4)(a).
48. See id. at art. 6.
49. See id. at art. 8.
50. See id.
51. Id. at art. 9(1) (emphasis added).
52. See id. at art. 9(2). This Note argues that Mexico is neither extraditing its
nationals nor competently prosecuting them at the present time.
53. See BLAXESLEY, supra note 40, at 185-86; BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 5.
54. See M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AuT DEDERE AuT JUDICARE:
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1995) (citing
Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, bk. II, ch. VI, at 136-37 (Charles G. Fenwick,
trans., Classics of International Law, 1916) (1758)); BLAKESLEY, supra note 40, at 185.
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of a natural law duty under international law either to extra-
dite the fugitive accused of a serious crime or to punish that
person under the laws of the state. 5 Early international law
scholars in an opposing camp, including Samuel Pufendorf,
considered extradition an obligation backed by international
law only in the presence of a treaty or comparable agreement.
5 6
Today, most countries, including the United States, recognize a
legal duty to extradite fugitives only when that duty has been




1. Extradition from the United States-Most limits that the
United States places on extradition are procedural in nature.
The provisions of the relevant treaty, supplemented by Title
18, govern the process of extradition.58
To request extradition of an individual from the United
States, a foreign state must first file a complaint made under
oath before a U.S. federal judge or magistrate. 59 A foreign na-
tion can file a request for extradition in two ways.' First, the
foreign government can submit a request to the State Depart-
ment, which will forward the request to the Department of
Justice.6" The U.S. Attorney in the district in which the fugitive
is located will file the complaint.62 Second, the foreign govern-
55. See BLAKESLEY, supra note 40, at 185 n.58. Writing in the seventeenth cen-
tury, Hugo Grotius discussed a duty to extradite or prosecute arising from the
common interest of all states in securing social and moral order and suppressing
crime. See BASSIOUNI & WISE, supra note 54, at 22; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 31,
at 5 (discussing the views of Grotius and de Vattel); BLAKESLEY, supra note 40, at 185
(discussing the views of Jean Bodin, Grotius, and de Vattel).
56. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 7 (1974); BLAKESLEY, supra note 40, at 185--86.
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 475 cmt. a (1987); BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 6, 49. As codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3184,
U.S. law does not extradite unless there is a valid extradition treaty in force between
the United States and the foreign nation at the time of the request. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1994); BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 107.
58. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL'LAw 814 (2d ed.
1995).
59. See id.





ment may retain private counsel who will file the request in
the appropriate federal district court."'
Once the complaint is filed, an arrest warrant is issued, and,
once arrested, the fugitive is brought before the issuing magis-
trate.' At the extradition hearing, the magistrate must make
the following findings of fact to certify the fugitive for extradi-
tion: (1) there is a valid extradition treaty in force between the
United States and the requesting nation; (2) the requested fu-
gitive is the person detained; (3) the fugitive does not fall
under an exception in the applicable treaty and therefore may
be extradited; and (4) the standard of proof of criminality es-
tablished in the treaty is met.6 Exceptions to extradition
include an exemption for those accused of political offenses
and the "dual criminality" exemption.6 In most extradition
treaties, the standard of proof required for extradition is
equivalent to probable cause in domestic criminal prosecu-
tions." If the magistrate certifies the fugitive for extradition,
the matter is forwarded to the Secretary of State, who makes
the final determination whether or not to surrender the indi-
vidual.68  Usually, once a fugitive has been judicially
determined to be appropriate for extradition, the Secretary of
63. See id.
64. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 58, at 814.
65. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 703; CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 58, at
814. Some courts have listed the requirements that the requesting state must meet in
a different fashion. For example, two California courts have listed five elements that
the judicial officer must establish before certifying a fugitive for extradition: the judi-
cial officer is authorized to conduct extradition proceedings; the court has jurisdiction
over the respondent; the applicable treaty is in full force and effect; the crimes for
which surrender is sought are included within the terms of the treaty; and, there is
probable cause that a crime or crimes were committed and that the respondents par-
ticipated in or committed it.
See In re Extradition of Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 1997); In re Ex-
tradition of Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 917 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
66. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 58, at 814-15. Dual criminality requires
that the charged offense be a crime in both countries. See id.
67. See id. at 815; see also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922) (holding
that magistrate judge need not determine that the evidence supports a conviction,
only that evidence justifies holding respondent for trial); United States ex rel. Sak-
aguchi v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that magistrate
judge need only determine that evidence establishes probable cause); United States v.
Barr, 619 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that a probable cause finding in
international extradition hearings means sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
belief of the guilt of the accused).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 58, at 815.
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State will refuse to extradite only if there is an applicable
exemption in the relevant treaty.
69
2. Extradition from Mexico to the United States-When
U.S. officials wish to prosecute an individual who is in a for-
eign country, the State Department handles the request to
that country. Requests may be made for convicted fugitives
who have fled the United States, as well as for persons
charged with a crime but not yet convicted.7" For an offense
against the United States, the U.S. Department of Justice
submits a request for extradition to the Secretary of State.7 As
long as there is an extradition treaty in force with the foreign
government, the Department of State transmits the request to
the appropriate American Embassy or consulate to be pre-
sented to foreign government officials.72
U.S. officials initiate a request for the extradition of a fugi-
tive in Mexico by submitting a formal extradition request to
the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 73 U.S. officials must
include a certified copy of a warrant for arrest, accompanied by
evidence justifying the apprehension of the individual sought,74
or if the individual has already been convicted, a certified copy
of a conviction against the individual.75 If the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs determines that the request fulfills the
requirements of applicable Mexican law and the U.S.-Mex. Ex-
tradition Treaty, the request is forwarded to the Mexican
69. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 58, at 815. The Secretary of State can
also use discretion based on technical, political, or humanitarian grounds to refuse to
extradite after judicial approval. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 768. Rejection of
extradition on technical grounds includes instances in which the Secretary of State
finds that there was an error in the judicial finding of probable cause. See id. at 768-
69. Political and humanitarian grounds are controlled by the executive because such
factors are not examined by the judiciary during an extradition hearing. See id. at
769. Humanitarian-based denials of extradition exist for instances in which the execu-
tive finds that, if the individual is extradited, he or she will be "persecuted... or
subjected to grave injustice." Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976); see
also BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 769 n.420 (discussing political and humanitarian
grounds for executive discretion).
70. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 791-93 (citing a memorandum issued by the
Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State).
71. See id. at 791. For an offense against an individual state or territory, the ap-
plication must be submitted to the State Department by the governor of the state or
territory. See id.
72. See id. at 791-92.
73. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 3; ZAGARIS
& PERALTA, supra note 24, at 551.
74. See U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 10(3)(a); Mexican In-
ternational Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 16.
75. See U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 10(4)(b); Mexican In-
ternational Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 16.
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Attorney General. 6 A Mexican district judge is assigned to the
case and examines the evidence to determine if facts show
"probable responsibility," the equivalent of probable cause in
the U.S.77 If there is sufficient evidence, the subject of the re-
quest is arrested and brought before the judge for an
extradition hearing. 7 At the hearing, the accused may defend
himself by arguing either that the extradition request does not
fulfil the legal or treaty-based requirements79 or that he is not
the person being sought.80 The district judge forwards her
opinion to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then makes
the final decision whether to grant or deny the extradition re-
quest.81 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs consults the district
judge's opinion and the material presented at the extradition
hearing but is not required to follow the judge's recommenda-
tion. 2 Following the decision by the Ministry, the individual is
either released from custody 3 or surrendered to the proper
authorities of the United States."
B. Jurisdiction
The territoriality principle can provide a government juris-
diction over a foreign national accused of drug trafficking and
related offenses." Subjective territoriality provides jurisdiction
over conduct that occurs within the state, while objective terri-
toriality grants jurisdiction over conduct when its effect
impacts the asserting state, even though the conduct itself oc-
curs outside the state's territorial borders."M Organized drug
trafficking enterprises fall within the objective territoriality
test because they meet the second criterion.
8 7
76. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 21.
77. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 544.
78. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 24.
79. See id. at art. 25(I).
80. See id. at art. 25(11).
81. See id. at art. 29.
82. See id. at art. 30; Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 548.
83. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 31.
84. See US.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 14(3).
85. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 553.
86. See BLAKESLEY, supra note 40, at 96, 106-07, 110; see also Zagaris & Peralta,
supra note 24, at 553 (discussing subjective and objective territoriality).
87. While operating beyond US. borders, foreign drug syndicates have a 'direct
and deleterious impact on Americans." Fiscal Year 1999 Commerce, Justice, State Ap-
propriations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State and the
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III. THE EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS'
Traditionally, governments have been hesitant to extradite
their nationals for foreign prosecution."' In the 1970s, the ma-
jority of extradition treaties included absolute exceptions to
extradition when the subject of the request was a national of
the requested state. 9 Today, most European and other civillaw
nations, including much of Latin America, refuse to extradite
nationals, while common law states generally will extradite.90
This reluctance is based on various justifications. First, states
feel a general duty to protect their sovereignty and to guard
their citizens from mistreatment and harm.91 Second, states
that exempt nationals allow their domestic authorities to
prosecute their citizens for acts done abroad, and they main-
tain that they can, and will, competently prosecute the
requested subjects domestically.92 Additionally, states are con-
cerned that a punishment prohibited or considered excessive
in their judicial system may be imposed upon their extradited
citizens.93 They also fear that their citizens will be at a disad-
vantage in foreign judicial proceedings, because they lack
familiarity with, or understanding of, foreign processes.'
Those accused of a crime and prosecuted in a foreign court
Judiciary of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations (Mar. 3, 1998) (statement of Thomas
A. Constantine, Drug Enforcement Administration), available in 1998 WL 8993445, at
*2 [hereinafter Constantine Statement). Constantine cited, as examples of these ef-
fects, drug-related crime and the large costs (an estimated 67 billion dollars in 1997)
associated with responding to drug problems in the U.S. See id.
88. See ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATION-
ALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAw ENFORCEMENT 426-27 (1993).
89. See I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW app. 11 (1971).
90. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 588; NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 430-34.
Germany, Switzerland, and France absolutely exempt nationals, but Italy will extra-
dite its nationals. Israel is one common law state that refuses to extradite its
nationals. In Latin America, Colombia has extradited its nationals in some cases. See
NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 430-34.
91. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 593; NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 427.
92. See Dea Abramschmitt, Neighboring Countries; Un-Neighborly Acts: A Look
at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico, and Canada, 4 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 121, 128-29 (1995).
93. Life imprisonment and capital punishment are examples. Colombia has, at
times, extradited nationals to the United States for prosecution. See United States v.
Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991). Although Colombian Presiden-
tial Decree No. 1860 authorized the extradition of Colombian nationals, the
Colombian government insisted that no Colombian would receive a prison sentence
longer than 30 years or be sentenced to death. See id.
94. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 427.
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may consider themselves punished from the moment of extra-
dition, because they are forcibly transported far from the
support of home and family.95
The United Nations General Assembly has resolved that re-
fusals to extradite based on nationality are reasonable. 6 When
extradition is refused on this basis, however, the United Na-
tions requests that the requested state take appropriate
domestic action against the requested fugitive.' Governments
that refuse to extradite nationals generally agree to prosecute
the accused domestically in order to appease the requesting
nation while avoiding extradition.98 Opponents of the blanket
exclusion of nationals from extradition argue that a person
should be held accountable to the laws and processes of the
place where he or she committed an offense.99 Thus, an indi-
vidual who commits an offense in another state must consider
the problems associated with foreign prosecution-such as un-
familiarity with the foreign system and trial far from the
support of home and family-before committing the offense
and should not argue that these concerns exempt him from
foreign prosecution."°
A. US. Viewpoints
The first extradition treaties signed by the United States
made no mention of extradition exemptions for nationals.''
95. See id.
96. See G.A. Res. 116, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 100, at art.
4(a), U.N. Doc. AIRESI45/116 (1991).
97. See id.
98. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 431.
99. See SHEARER, supra note 89, at 121-22.
100. However, fear of a false conviction in a foreign court is different. It is legiti-
mate for a country to be hesitant about sending its citizens for prosecution on false
charges. However, in most extradition regimes, the requested country performs a
hearing to determine the validity of the charges before certifying an individual for
extradition. See, e.g., U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 3; Extradi-
tion Treaty, Mar. 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, art. III, 31 U.S.T. 892 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan
Extradition Treaty]; Extradition Treaty, June 7, 1934, U.S.-Iraq, art. I(a), T.S. 907
[hereinafter U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty]; Extradition Treaty, Jan. 19-Jan. 21, 1922,
U.S.-Venez., art. I, 43 Stat. 1698 [hereinafter U.S.-Venez. Extradition Treaty]. This
process protects individuals from false convictions.
101. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 427; ROBERT W. RAFUSE, THE EXTRA-
DITION OF NATIONALS 17-19, 79-80 (1939). The extradition treaties with Switzerland
(1850), Hawaii (1849), France (1843), and Great Britain (1842) provide for the delivery
of all "persons" who commit a crime in one country and are later found in another. See
RAFUSE, supra, at 17-19. Implicitly, these treaties allow the extradition of nationals.
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The United States has traditionally opposed treaty clauses
that exempt nationals from extradition, and it does not pro-
hibit extradition of U.S. citizens to other states for
prosecution.1° Despite the fact that the U.S. is not opposed to
extraditing nationals, most extradition treaties signed by the
United States do not obligate either nation to treat nationals
on an equal basis with foreigners in extradition proceedings.
10 3
One common provision in U.S. extradition treaties provides
that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to de-
liver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of
this convention."' °4 Some extradition treaties, such as the
treaty between Mexico and the United States, give the execu-
tive discretionary power to determine whether to extradite a
national.15
The United States has recently extradited U.S. citizens to
Mexico. °  Because of its proximity to the Mexican border and
the dedication of former U.S. Attorney Alan Bersin, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California in San
Diego has been the site of many of these extraditions."° For
example, in December 1997, the court certified a U.S. citizen for
extradition to Mexico to face murder and criminal conspiracy
However, Nadelmann notes that, despite the treaties' words, France refused to extra-
dite its citizens, and Switzerland extradited only one citizen before re-negotiating the
treaty. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 427.
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 475 reporter's note 4 (1987); SHEARER, supra note 89, at 110.
103. See U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 9(1); infra note 104
and accompanying text.
104. BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 589. See also, e.g., U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty,
supra note 43, at art. 9(1) ("Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver Its
own nationals."); U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, supra note 100, at art. VIII ([N]either
of the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens."); U.S.-
Venez. Extradition Treaty, supra note 100, at art. VIII ("Under the stipulations of this
Convention, neither of the Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own
citizens.").
105. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 589, 767-68; U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty,
supra note 43, at art. 9(1); see also U.S.-Japan Extradition Treaty, supra note 100, at
art. V (granting each party the discretion to extradite its own nationals).
106. In 1997, the U.S. State Department extradited 21 individuals to Mexico, two
of whom were U.S. citizens. See Strategy Report, supra note 24. Also in 1997, Mexico
extradited 13 fugitives to the United States-eight were U.S. citizens and five were
third-country nationals. See id.
107. The U.S. District Court in San Diego also generally favors the use of interna-
tional extradition to combat crime. Federal District Judge Marilyn Huff, to whom
Alfredo Hodoyan Palacios and Emilio Valdez Mainero argued for reversal of the mag-
strate's certification of extradition, was quoted by the San Diego Union-Tribune as
saying that she believed in the use of extradition as a "tool" to fight international drug
trafficking and associated violence. Valerie Alvord, Federal Judge Affirms Extradition
of Alleged Tijuana Cartel Hit Men, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at B4.
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charges."8 Mexico would like to prosecute U.S. citizens, Alfredo
Hodoyan Palacios and Emilio Valdez Mainero, both suspected
assassins and organizers for the Arellano F6lix drug cartel."°
However, neither man has been sent to Mexico as of the writ-
ing of this Note, pending the outcome of an appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.110
In addition, the federal court in San Diego granted a peti-
tion by Mexico for the extradition of two U.S. citizens to face
homicide and weapons offense charges in 1994.11' Mexico had
requested the extradition of Carlos Enrique Garcia and Jesus
Zamora-Salas, members of a San Diego gang and alleged AFO
bodyguards and hitmen."2 The two were suspected in a drug-
related shooting at the International Airport in Guadalajara,
Mexico, in which seven people, including a Roman Catholic
Cardinal, were killed."3 As Title 18 and the extradition treaty
require, the petition for approval was granted and forwarded
to the Secretary of State for the final decision regarding sur-
render of the suspects.1
4
The Southern District of California is not the only forum
which has authorized the extradition of U.S. nationals to Mex-
ico. In 1980, the Fifth Circuit refused to block the extradition to
Mexico of two U.S. citizens who faced murder, attempted mur-
der, and attempted kidnapping charges."' The court rejected the
108. See In re Extradition of Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
109. See Alvord, supra note 107. Hodoyan is implicated in the planning and execu-
tion of the assassination of Mexico's top federal drug prosecutor, Ernesto Ibarra
Santes, who was ambushed in Mexico City in September 1996. See Julia Preston &
Craig Pyes, Mexico Wins Extradition of Two Defendants from US. for Drug-Killing
Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1998, at A5. Valdez is wanted in Mexico for various crimes
including murder, firearms violations, criminal association charges tying him to drug
trafficking, and assassinations for the AFO. See Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1213-14; see
also infra Part IV (discussing Mexico's recent problems with corruption).
110. See Alleged Cartel Hit Man Pleads Guilty, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 22,
1998, at B2. On February 19, 1998, Valdez pleaded guilty to arranging a cocaine deal
from prison while awaiting extradition in San Diego. See Nancy Cleeland, Cartel Sus-
pect Admits Plotting Cocaine Deal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, at A3. The mandatory
ten year sentence carried by the cocaine charge ensures that Valdez will serve some
time in a U.S. prison before the State Department extradites him to Mexico. See id.
111. See In re Extradition of Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
112. See id. at 917.
113. See id. at 916-17.
114. See id. at 925. Zamora-Salas was extradited to Mexico but was released from
Mexican custody in January 1996. See Sebastian Rotella, 3 Suspects in Slaying of
Cardinal Released in Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1996, at Al.
115. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980). The court
was compelled to use the 1899 extradition treaty, see Treaty of Extradition Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States, Feb. 22, 1899, 31 Stat.
1818, T.S. 242, because the initial extradition request by Mexico had been filed before
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petitioners' argument that the United States should refuse ex-
tradition requests by Mexico for U.S. citizens, because Mexico
has traditionally refused to extradite Mexican nationals.
116
The United States has also authorized extradition of na-
tionals to other countries with which it has treaties similar to
the U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty. For example, the treaty with
Colombia does not require that either nation extradite its na-
tionals, but gives the executive branch the discretion to do so
in cases it deems appropriate. 117 In 1986, the Fifth Circuit cer-
tified Robert Henry Russell for extradition to Colombia." 8
Russell, an American citizen, was charged and convicted in ab-
sentia in Colombia for defrauding the Colombian government
of more than 13 million dollars."'
The historical willingness of the United States to extradite
U.S. citizens to foreign states can be contrasted to the persis-
tent refusal of Mexico to extradite Mexican nationals.
B. Mexican Viewpoints
Mexico's reluctance to extradite its nationals is manifested
in the Mexican law on extradition, which states: "No Mexican
the current treaty went into effect in 1980. See id. at 1100 n.1. Article IV of the 1899
extradition treaty gave the executive branches of Mexico and the United States dis-
cretion over the extradition of nationals. See id. at 1104. Similar language in Article 9
of the current extradition treaty gives the executive office of each country the same
discretion that it held under the former (1899) treaty. See id. at 1106.
116. See id. at 1106-07. The United States does not deny requests based on a lack
of reciprocal extraditions by the requesting state. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at
594.
117. See Extradition Treaty U.S.-Colom., Sept. 14, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-8,
at art. 8 [hereinafter U.S.-Colom. Extradition Treaty]. Colombia has deemed drug
trafficking and money laundering to be crimes for which extradition is appropriate.
See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 433. In the mid-1980s, Colombia allowed the ex-
tradition of drug traffickers to the United States in recognition of the fact that the
US. criminal justice system was better suited to bring these criminals to justice. See
id. at 432.
118. See In re Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1986). Between
1984 and 1991, the United States extradited a total of three US. citizens to Colombia.
See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 432-33. During that same period, Colombia extra-
dited approximately 40 Colombian citizens to the United States, mostly to face
narcotics-related charges. See id. In 1991, Colombia adopted a new constitution that
explicitly banned extradition of Colombian nationals. See id. In November 1997, how-
ever, the Colombian Congress passed a law re-establishing the extradition of
Colombian drug traffickers. See US. Criticizes Colombian Law on Drug Lords, N.Y
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at A14.
119. See Russell, 805 F.2d at 1216; Man Convicted in Colombia Freed on Bond,
UNITED PRESS INT'L, Dec. 24, 1986.
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shall be surrendered to a foreign state, save in cases consid-
ered exceptional by the Executive, who may so determine."120
Under Mexican law, the courts have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Mexican citizens no matter where the crimes
take place. 121 Mexico justifies its refusal to extradite nationals
on the ground that domestic courts will competently prosecute
the offenders.
122
During the twentieth century, Mexican diplomats have sent
a series of mixed messages regarding the extradition of na-
tionals. In 1928, U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg
questioned Mexican foreign affairs officials about the apparent
black-letter refusal to extradite nationals. I" The Mexican gov-
ernment assured Kellogg that Mexico did not have a policy of
refusing requests for extradition of Mexican nationals to the
United States solely on the basis of their nationality.'
History has shown a contrary Mexican intention. In 1957
and 1961, the Mexican Executive denied requests by the
United States for the extradition of Mexican citizens accused
of murder and violations of narcotics laws without any expla-
nation of why these cases were not considered serious enough
to warrant extradition.'25 Mexican sources report that between
1984 and 1996, the United States submitted 151 extradition
requests.'26 The Mexican Attorney General reported that Mex-
ico extradited 39 U.S. and third-country citizens to the United
States between 1988 and 1996.127 It was not until 1996, how-
ever, that any fugitive of even questionable Mexican
nationality was deported or extradited for prosecution in the
United States.
In 1996, three individuals who might be considered Mexican
citizens were extradited to the United States. 128 In January
1996, Mexican law enforcement arrested Juan Garcia Abrego
and promptly flew him to Houston, where he had already been
120. Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 14.
121. See Abramschmitt, supra note 92, at 128 (citing-MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA: THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF MEXICO § 1.30.52 (1988)).
122. See 6 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 866, 877-78 (1968). But see
discussion infra Part IV (noting that Mexico cannot effectively prosecute major drug
traffickers in its domestic courts at this time).
123. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 530.
124. See id.
125. See WHITEMAN, supra note 122, at 867-68.
126. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 532.
127. See id. at 532 & n.45.
128. See id. at 611-12; Sam Dillon, Mexico Arrests a Top Suspect in Drug Trade,
N.Y TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at Al.
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indicted on charges of cocaine possession, cocaine distribution
and importation, and money laundering.29 In April 1996,
Mexico authorized the extradition of Francisco Gdmez Garcia
and Aaron Morel LeBar6n, two more Mexican nationals who
were wanted by U.S. law enforcement. 3 ' Gdmez Garcia had
already been convicted in Arizona state courts on charges of
sexual abuse and sexual conduct with a minor.13' LeBar6n was
a fugitive of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(RICO) charges in the U.S. District Court in Houston.
132
Mexico was able to rationalize these extraditions without
changing its policy against extraditing nationals. The govern-
ment considered Abrego a dual citizen of Mexico and the
United States." Therefore, Mexico considered him a foreigner
and could expel him without an extradition or deportation
hearing."M Mexican officials rationalized the extradition of
Gimez Garcia because he had already been tried and con-
victed in an Arizona state court. 13 The United States helped
Mexico justify its extradition of LeBar6n by labeling him a U.S.
citizen based on the fact that both his father and mother hold
U.S. citizenship. 136 Additionally, both LeBar6n and Gdmez Gar-
cia declined to exercise their rights under the Mexican
constitution to fight the extradition, which further justified
Mexico's decision."7 In each of these cases, Mexico found a
loophole that allowed it to comply with U.S. requests for extra-
dition while still maintaining its sovereignty.
Nevertheless, U.S. officials touted these extraditions as the
light at the end of the tunnel. Bob Weiner, Director of Public
Affairs for the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy, called Abrego's arrest and expulsion "a signal that in-
ternational cooperation can break the formerly impenetrable
shield held by the narco-traffickers.""8 In early 1997, Jonathan
Winer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau for Interna-
tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, called the
129. See John Ward Anderson, Alleged Drug Kingpin Arrested in Mexico: Abrego,
One of FBI's 10 Most Wanted, Flown to Houston to Face '93 Indictment, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 1998, at All; Dillon, supra note 128, at Al.
130. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 611.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 612.
133. See Dillon, supra note 128.
134. See id.
135. See Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 611-12.
136. See id. at 612.
137. See id. at 611-12.
138. Anderson, supra note 129, at All.
[VOL. 31:4
SUMMER 1998] Extraditing Mexican Nationals
LeBar6n and Gimez Garcia extraditions an important step
and predicted "additional Mexican extraditions in the near fu-
ture."3 9 Since the extradition of LeBar6n and GAmez Garcia
more than two years ago, however, no further progress has
been made on this front despite the more than 120 active ex-
tradition requests pending with Mexico. 140 Extradition to the
United States could be a powerful deterrent to Mexican drug
traffickers. However, isolated instances of extradition, coupled
with the Mexican government's rationalization, do not repre-
sent a change in policy. Therefore, freewheeling narco-
traffickers have no more reason to fear extradition today than
they did before 1996.
Mexico desperately wants to be considered an equal in its
international relations with traditionally stronger and more
prominent countries such as the United States." There has
been a move in recent decades toward cooperation between the
United States and Mexico in diverse areas such as law en-
forcement, trade, and the environment., 2 These measures can
only succeed if each country respects the other.
The issue of the United States' disrespect for Mexico was
brought to the forefront of inter-American relations in the early
1990s after the United States entered Mexico and forcibly
139. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 532.
140. See Telephone Interview with Representative of the Office of International
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Active extradition requests refer to those for which some
action is currently being taken. See id. Within the 120 current active requests are
crimes and people of all nationalities, including Mexican citizens, U.S. citizens, and
other nations' citizens who have fled to Mexico. See id. Approximately one-third of
those active extradition requests are for narcotics offenses. See id. The Office of Inter-
national Affairs at the DOJ explains that there are not many active requests for
Mexican citizens because of Mexico's refusal to extradite. See id. First, the Office does
not want to work on "futile" cases. See id. Second, an extradition request gives the
foreign government valuable information on cases of interest to the DOJ and alerts
the government, and potentially the subject of the request, to charges about which
they may be unaware. See id.
141. See Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious
Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 126, 186-87 (1993).
142. See, e.g., Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-
Mex., art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-13 (1988) (pledging to provide mutual legal assis-
tance in criminal matters to cooperate in the prevention, investigation, and
prosecution of crimes); North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature
Dec. 11, 1992, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. 289 (establishing free trade area, eliminating trade
barriers, promoting fair competition, and providing for the resolution of trade dis-
putes); US. Trade Representative Office, North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF NAFTA 158, 159 (1974)
(reconfirming environmental cooperation between the United States, Mexico, and
Canada).
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abducted a Mexican national, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain. 143
Alvarez-Machain was brought to the United States to face
charges in connection with the kidnapping, torture, and
murder of Enrique Camarena-Salazar, a DEA Special Agent,
and Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, his Mexican pilot.'" Mexico
considered the abduction an outrageous violation of its
sovereignty.
1 45
The fact that Camarena was a DEA Agent made the issue
even more heated than normal. At the time of the abduction,
Mexico had never extradited a Mexican national to the United
States under the terms of the 1978 treaty.141 U.S. law enforce-
ment officials were concerned that Mexico would invoke the
"nationals exception" and refuse to extradite Alvarez-
Machain. 147 DEA officials attempted to secure the presence of
Alvarez-Machain in the United States through informal dis-
cussions with Mexican police officials. 48 When that failed, they
turned to a contact in Mexico to whom they paid $50,000 plus
expenses to kidnap Alvarez-Machain and deliver him to El
Paso, Texas. 149 When the plan succeeded, Mexico was furious
and publicly protested the abduction and the subsequent 1992
Supreme Court opinion that legitimized the abduction by giv-
ing U.S. jurisdiction.150 Mexico's primary source of indignation
was the invasion of its sovereignty, not the guilt or innocence
of Alvarez-Machain.1 51
Ultimately, on December 14, 1992, the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California dismissed the charges
against Alvarez-Machain because of a dire lack of direct evi-
dence tying the doctor to the kidnapping, torture, and murder
143. See Lee, supra note 141, at 157-61.
144. See id. at 157-58.
145. See id. at 186.
146. See Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sovereign Right: The Kidnapping of
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 HOUS. J. IN'L L. 829,
837 n.28 (1997).
147. See Lee, supra note 141, at 157, 159.
148. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-03 (C.D. Cal.
1990). Although negotiations broke down, the DEA first attempted to secure Alvarez-
Machain's presence in the United States through informal cooperative means. See id.
at 602. The DEA attempted to trade the delivery of Alvarez-Machain by Mexican fed-
eral police for the deportation by the United States of Isaac Naredo Moreno, a fugitive
of Mexican justice who was living in the United States. See id.
149. See id. at 602-03.
150. See U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992); Zaid, supra note 146, at
841-42.
151. See Zaid, supra note 146, at 841-42.
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of Camarena.52 Alvarez-Machain was released from custody,
but significant damage had been done. In an era of movement
toward increased cooperation, the United States gravely over-
stepped its bounds, violated the extradition treaty, and
effectively confirmed Mexican suspicions about American dis-
respect for international standards.
IV. WHY MEXICO SHOULD EXTRADITE
A MEXICAN INTERNATIONAL DRUG OFFENDER-AN
"EXCEPTIONAL" PROBLEM
Since the nineteenth century, American law enforcement
has characterized its counterpart in Mexico as corrupt, ineffec-
tive, and unwilling to cooperate in cross-border investigations.'53
Incidents in recent years have shown that the Mexican state
and federal law enforcement agencies, military, and Executive
are riddled with corruption.' The government organizations
instrumental in the fight against drugs are appealing targets
for traffickers' corruption efforts.55 Drug traffickers have the
money to entice government officials with lucrative payoffs
and the power to ensure cooperation through threats and vio-
lence. "'56 A common Mexican saying gives insight into the
power held by the corrupting forces: "Take the Plata o plomo-
the silver or the lead"-either take the money or the bullet."57
Former DEA Chief of Operations Doug Wankel said, "Money
152. See Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1992, at A20. Mydans reported that on Dec. 14, 1992, Judge Edward Rafeedie dis-
missed the charges against Alvarez-Machain, because the evidence presented by the
government "had been based on 'hunches' and the 'wildest speculation' and had failed
to support the charge, that [the doctor] had participated in the torture [or killing] of
[Agent] Camarena." Id.; see also Jeffrey J. Carlisle, Extradition of Government Agents
as a Municipal Law Remedy for State-Sponsored Kidnapping, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1541,
1551 n.63 (1993).
153. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 61-62.
154. See Mark Fineman & Sebastian Rotella, The Drug Web that Entangles Mex-
ico: The Nation's Deepening Crises and a New Attack on Corruption Expose the
Sinister Ties Between Cartels and Government, Investigators Say, L.A. TIMES, June
15, 1995, at Al.
155. See Julia Preston, A General in Mexico's Drug War is Dismissed on Narcotics
Charges, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at Al.
156. See Fineman & Rotella, supra note 154, at Al; Sebastian Rotella, Mexico's
Cartels Sow Seeds of Corruption, Destruction, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1995, at Al; Stern
& Walker, supra note 1, at Al. American officials estimate that the AFO spends one
million dollars each week paying federal, state, and local officials for their non-
interference and protection. See Marshall Statement, supra note 14, at *7.
157. NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 258.
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corrupts ... and in Mexico it's getting to the point where the
traffickers can corrupt absolutely."'
Mexico should extradite international drug offenders to the
United States because effective domestic prosecution of these
individuals is currently impossible in Mexico.15 The drug car-
tels control political, judicial, and law enforcement structures
in Mexico and threaten Mexican sovereignty so much that
Mexico has classified them as the "principal national security"
threat.6 0 Because of their especially violent and disruptive na-
ture, drug crimes should be considered "exceptional" and
should fit within the exception to Mexico's codified prohibition
of extradition of nationals.
An "Exceptional" Problem
Mexican law restricts the extradition of Mexican nationals
to those cases determined to be "exceptional" by the Mexican
Executive.161 The narco-traffickers requested for extradition by
158. Sam Dillon & Craig Pyes, Shadow on the Border-A Special Report: Drug
Ties Taint 2 Mexican Governors, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at Al.
159. One example is the case of Rafael Mufioz Talavera. See Sam Dillon & Craig
Pyes, Foiled Drug Pursuit of a Mexican Bares a System Rife with Graft, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1998, at Al. Mufoz was arrested in 1989 by Mexican police after he was im-
plicated as the leader of a cartel whose 21.4 tons of cocaine were uncovered in a
California drug bust five weeks earlier. See id. Mufoz was identified as the leader of
the cartel by traffickers arrested during the seizure in the largest single drug bust in
history. See id. In the first trial against Mufioz, he was acquitted for a lack of strong
evidence tying him to the cocaine. See id. With the help of Assistant U.S. Attorneys
and DEA agents, Mufloz was convicted in a second trial in 1995, but a Mexican ap-
pellate panel released him a year later, ruling that he had been tried twice for the
same charges. See id. American prosecutors complain that the evidence against Mu-
floz was "overwhelming" and that his ability to evade punishment is the result of
bribery of the Federal Police Commander and the Mexican Deputy Attorney General
who were in charge of the case against him. See id. Mexican and American officials
suspect that the first prosecution was rigged by prosecutors who presented only weak
evidence to a lenient judge. See id.
160. Strategy Report, supra note 24.
161. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, art. 15. Because
the wording of the law has been the same since before the turn of the century, and
Mexico has never authorized the extradition of a Mexican national, interpretation of
.exceptional" in this law is quite difficult. Compare id. with Ley de Extradicion de la
Republica Mexicana, art. 10(II) (May 18, 1897). In an explanation of its refusal to ex-
tradite a Mexican national charged with the larceny of over $25,000 in 1944, the
Mexican Foreign Minister told the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico that Mexico reserves
extradition of nationals to "grave cases in the judgement of the Executive. The gravity
of the acts should be considered from the international point of view." WHrTEMAN,
supra note 122, at 866. In 1957 and 1961, the Mexican Executive refused to extradite
Mexican nationals accused of narcotics law violations and murder without explaining
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the United States have committed exceptional crimes. The in-
ternational drug trade is a unique industry, more far-reaching
and disturbing than other criminal activities which plague the
hemisphere. 62 There is an estimated 49 billion dollar annual
market for illegal drugs in the United States." The Mexican
narco-traffickers are thriving on this demand.1" The cartels
overwhelm Mexico and have ensured that Mexico will not rid
itself of violence and corruption any time in the near future."5
Law enforcement officials in the United States believe that
drug corruption in the Mexican criminal justice system makes
law enforcement efforts in Mexico largely ineffective." Suspi-
cion on both sides of the border has diminished cooperative
measures between the United States and Mexico. Asymmetri-
cal criminal law practices and cultural norms have contributed
to ineffective cooperation even when the two countries attempt
to work together.167 American authorities have found that in-
formal means of cross-border cooperation can accomplish
objectives more efficiently and effectively than some formal
methods." While informal cooperation can be a relatively easy
way to solve a problem, it also can lead to international inci-
dents and criticism which hinder progress toward healthy
relations, as evidenced by the fallout from the Alvarez-
Machain case.l6 9 One of the first steps that must be taken in
why those cases were not of the "grave" nature for which extradition would be
granted. See id. at 867.
162. The cartels have infiltrated the Mexican government at all levels, threaten-
ing Mexican democratic institutions and severely diminishing their effectiveness in
fighting narcotics crime. See Strategy Report, supra note 24. International drug traf-
ficking is a multi-billion dollar enterprise for the Mexican cartels. See Fineman &
Rotella, supra note 154, at Al. The cartels are also the perpetrators of ruthless tran-
snational violence that has taken the lives of law enforcement and other government
officials, as well as private citizens. See Marshall Statement, supra note 14, at *8.
163. See Brook Larmer et al., A Leap of Faith, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1997, at 34,
36.
164. In 1995, U.S. DEA Chief Thomas Constantine estimated that the leaders of
Mexico's major cartels make seven billion dollars in annual profits. See Fineman &
Rotella, supra note 154.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 6-7. Basic differences exist between what
conduct countries choose to criminalize and the degree to which those criminal laws
will be enforced. See id. at 6.
168. See id. at 61-62. Informal means of cooperation include the use of tricks to
lure fugitives to the United States or to a third country which will more readily extra-
dite the fugitive. See id. at 436. Endeavors to seize and kidnap fugitives to the United
States also are often conducted with the assistance of local foreign agents. See id. at
443.
169. See id. at 460.
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the war against drugs is to institutionalize cooperative meas-
ures, such as extradition of international criminals without
regard to nationality.
The Mexican government does not appropriate enough re-
sources to fight the cartels effectively. A study by the
Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico (National
Autonomous University of Mexico) (UNAM) reported that the
Mexican Federal Attorney General's annual budget is only
about 200 million dollars, while the drug cartels spend as
much as 500 million dollars a year bribing officials.170
The corruption of Mario Ruiz Massieu, Mexico's former top
anti-narcotics enforcer, required a reported 17 million dol-
lars."" The amount is considerably less for the lower-level
officials and officers. In 1997, a typical police officer in Mexico
made 300 dollars a month, and soldiers made 190 dollars a
month, while the cartels paid their bodyguards between 2,000
and 3,000 dollars a week."'2 According to an aide to President
Zedillo, "The police have become the personal army of the nar-
cotics traffickers.""' When a low-paid official in a position of
trust and power is given the chance to earn some extra
"salary" by looking the other way or even guarding a shipment
of drugs, he can hardly be expected to resist--especially when
resistance means a bite of the "Plomo."
On April 30, 1997, Mexican Attorney General Jorge Ma-
drazo Cuellar dismantled the Esfuerzo Nacional en el Combate
al Narcotrdfico (Institute for Combating Drugs) (INCD), the
Mexican equivalent of the DEA, after an announcement that
the director of the organization and many of its agents were
working for drug traffickers. The INCD was created in 1993 to
replace other corrupt drug-fighting organizations."'' General
170. See Fineman & Rotella, supra note 154, at Al (citing a recent study by
UNAM).
171. See Todd Robberson, Mexican Held in US. Linked to Drug Cartel: Bribes May
Play Role in Probe of Killing, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
172. See Linda Robinson, An Inferno Next Door, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb.
24, 1997, at 36, 38.
173. Michael S. Serrill, Mexico's Black Mood, TIME INT'L EDITION, Oct. 7, 1996, at
14, available in LEXIS, News Library, Time File.
174. See Sam Dillon, Mexico Shakes Up Anti-Drug Force, N.Y TIMES, May 1, 1997,
at Al. In place of the INCD, the Mexican government created the Special Prosecutor's
Office for Attention to Drug Crimes under the Office of the Attorney General. See
Strategy Report, supra note 24. The new anti-drug czar, Mariano Herran Salvatti, is
taking steps to ensure that the new Special Prosecutor's Office does not end up cor-
rupted like its predecessors. See id. at 5. All personnel assigned to the Office,
including those previously employed by the INCD, will go through screening, includ-
ing background checks and financial, psychological, drug, and polygraph
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Jesus Guti~rrez Rebollo was dismissed from his post as direc-
tor of the Institute in February, 1997." '7 He faces accusations of
receiving monetary and other material benefits through his
association with Amado Carrillo Fuentes, one of the wealthiest
and most powerful Mexican drug lords.' Guti6rrez was the
third high-ranking federal drug official to be accused of taking
payments from drug-traffickers in this decade.' Javier Coello
Trejo, who served as Mexico's drug czar in 1989 and 1990, and
Mario Ruiz Massieu, a former Deputy Attorney General who
was Mexico's drug coordinator in 1993 and 1994, were both
charged with taking large payments from Mexican drug traf-
fickers." 8 American officials also accused the governors of the
Mexican states of Sonora and Morelos of taking payoffs from
Carrillo in exchange for protecting Carrillo's drug smuggling
operations.' 9 Mexican defense officials reported that between
the February 1997 dismissal of General Guti6rrez and August
1997, thirty-three other officers in the Mexican military, in-
cluding four generals, were dismissed for corruption and
narcotics charges. 80 When sworn into office, each of these men
was viewed as honest, but none could resist the monetary
power held by drug lords.
Vulnerable Mexican law enforcement officers and prosecu-
tors do not take lightly the threats of violent retribution for
non-compliance with drug cartel wishes. Rival drug cartels en-
gage in massive turf wars against each other, catching law
enforcement agencies in the middle. The cartels assassinate
key political and law enforcement officials and engage in pub-
lic gun battles armed with automatic weapons." In May 1993,
hit-men hired by the Arellano F6lix cartel pumped fourteen
bullets into the body of Cardinal Posadas at the Guadalajara
airport, mistaking him for a rival cartel leader.' 2 During
March and April of 1994, there were three major incidents of
examinations. See id. Members of the Office will receive increased training, including
specialized training in the United States. See id. The Mexican government has also
announced that agents will receive premium pay and increased benefits, in an effort
to reduce the incentive to accept bribes. See id.
175. See Preston, supra note 155, at Al.
176. See id.; Julia Preston, Another Mexican General is Arrested and Charged
with Links to Drug Cartel, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at As.
177. See Preston, supra note 155, at Al.
178. See id.; Fineman & Rotella, supra note 154.
179. See Dillon & Pyes, supra note 159.
180. See Julia Preston & Craig Pyes, Mexican Tale: Drugs, Crime, Torture and the
US, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at Al.
181. See Rotella, supra note 156.
182. See id.; see also supra Part III.A.
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violence in the state of Baja California." The first was a close-
range battle in March between Ramon Arellano's bodyguards
and Mexican elite federal drug enforcement officers and state
police officers.' Five men were killed in the exchange, in-
cluding the commander of the federal anti-drug unit.' The
early 1994 public assassinations of presidential candidate Luis
Donaldo Colosio and Federico Benitez Lopez, the reformist
chief of the Tijuana police, have been attributed to the Arel-
lano cartel and Tijuana drug lords.' In September 1996, First
Commander Ernesto Ibarra Santes, Chief of the Federal Judi-
cial Police for Baja California, was assassinated in Mexico
City.187 As the chief drug enforcement official in Baja Califor-
nia, Ibarra had taken a strong stand against the AFO by
increasing the number of Tijuana-based agents to fight specifi-
cally against the cartel and by speaking out against law
enforcement collusion with the traffickers."' In March 1997,
Brigadier General Alfredo Navarro Lara was arrested after
allegedly offering the top federal justice official in Baja Cali-
fornia a multimillion-dollar bribe on behalf of the Arellano
Felix cartel."8 9 The power of the Mexican drug cartels was more
fully exposed when Navarro Lara admitted that he had been
coerced into making the bribery offer by the Arellano F6lix
brothers, who had threatened to kill the Brigadier General's
child.19°
The violence of the cartels is not limited to government offi-
cials and Mexican soil.19' In July 1997, the tortured body of an
important witness in a McAllen, Texas trial of seven major
Mexican marijuana traffickers was found decomposing across
the border in Reynosa, Mexico.'92 The witness was kidnapped
in McAllen the day before the trial was set to begin.
193
Narcotics and associated criminal behavior have overpow-
ered Mexico, and narcotics-related corruption is entangled




187. See Serrill, supra note 173, at 14.
188. See id.; Gross, supra note 6, at Al.
189. See Preston, supra note 155.
190. See id.






with the Mexican criminal justice system.'" The reformation of
Mexican law enforcement has begun, but the cartels have a
tight grasp. While Mexico is reforming, innocent civilians and
honest police officers lose their lives, and drugs continue to
pour over the border at an alarming rate.195 Under the current
Mexican extradition law, no Mexican will be surrendered to a
foreign prosecutor unless it is an "exceptional" case.1" Mexico
should recognize that "exceptional" is the perfect label for the
narcotics-related crimes that are overwhelming Mexico and
the United States.
CONCLUSION
Mexican cartels are becoming the largest suppliers of co-
caine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines that enter
the United States. l"7 The cartels perpetrate violence and cor-
ruption in both the United States and Mexico. 98 Without
cooperation between the United States and Mexico, the strug-
gle to put an end to the power held by the drug cartels in
Mexico and to stem the flow of illegal drugs out of Mexico is a
futile one. Extradition of a major narco-trafficker is a possibil-
ity, and for such an extradition to occur, the Mexican Executive
must take a strong stand against the cartels.
Mexican law enforcement officials have shown that they are
capable of arresting members of major cartels, but the highest-
ranking cartel leaders know that the chance of arrest is slim,
the chance of conviction even smaller, and the chance of an ex-
tended incarceration almost nonexistent.19 Even if imprisoned
194. See Strategy Report, supra note 24.
195. The 1995 Annual Report of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
California indicated that cocaine seizures at the Southwest Border increased 20%
between 1993 and 1995 to 80% of the total cocaine seized in the United States. See
Bersin, supra note 15, at 1416 (citing 1995 U.S. Atr'Y S.D. CAL. ANN. REP.). Mexico is
also a major producer of the marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamines that are im-
ported to the United States. See Strategy Report, supra note 24.
196. See Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 14.
197. See Strategy Report, supra note 24.
198. See id.
199. See discussion supra Introduction, Part IV (illustrating recent narcotics-
offense arrests made by Mexican law enforcement). Mexico reports that for 1997, its
conviction rate for narcotics-related charges was 96%. See Strategy Report, supra note
24. Many of the cartel leaders continue to run free in Mexico, however. For example,
Miguel Caro-Quintero, the leader of the Sonora-based Caro-Quintero cartel, was ar-
rested in Mexico in 1992. See Marshall Statement, supra note 14, at *6. Caro-Quintero
used "a combination of threats and bribes' to convince a federal judge to dismiss the
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in Mexico, cartel leaders may be able to run their drug syndi-
cates from prison using the same corruption techniques that
have kept them in business on the outside.
One positive sign is that the Mexican judiciary has recently
found the strength and integrity to certify some narco-
traffickers for extradition to the United States.2" If the
Mexican government will extradite these or other Mexican
narco-criminals wanted by U.S. authorities, a federal conviction
in the United States will likely lead to a serious sentence.
Admittedly, an extradition process remains subject to corruption
during the arrest, the judicial certification for extradition, and
the physical transfer to the United States. Mexican officials,
however, are taking steps to remove corruption from Mexican
law enforcement."'
Overall, extradition is less susceptible to undue influence
than prosecution and incarceration in Mexico, because there
are fewer stages at which undue influence can be exerted. The
narco-traffickers face a greater chance of punishment in the
United States because once they are in U.S. hands, two phases
of prosecution that are vulnerable to Mexican corruption are
eliminated. First, since the only Mexican judges in the process
will be those determining the eligibility of the individual for
extradition, there will be fewer judges involved in the criminal
process and therefore fewer opportunities for judicial bribery
and threats. A trial held on U.S. soil will hopefully ensure a
trial untainted by the power of the accused.2" Second, because
sentencing and imprisonment will take place in the United
States, the trafficker presumably will have less leverage to
bribe, threaten, or coordinate a lenient sentence or to continue
coordinating his criminal enterprise from prison.2 3
More importantly, once Mexico extradites a few narco-
traffickers to the United States, the message will be clear that
immunity has lapsed. The people of Mexico will see that the
charges against him and set him loose to operate freely. Id. Also, although he is a fugi-
tive wanted by both U.S. and Mexican law enforcement with a two million dollar
bounty on his head, Ram6n Arellano continues to live a public life at clubs and social
events in Mexico. See Gross, supra note 6, at Al.
200. See discussion supra note 24.
201. See discussion supra Part IV.
202. One can always be optimistic that the extradition of narco-traffickers from
Mexico would not lead to increased corruption in the United States. See NADELMANN,
supra note 88, at 265.
203. While the United States may not be perfect, by relative standards, U.S. law
enforcement agencies, federal government officials, and the federal judiciary are
nearly free of corruption. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 264-66.
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cartels no longer hold near-complete control, which may em-
bolden the populace to take a stand against the cartels,
effectively taking away yet another line of the traffickers' de-
fense. Aid from the United States in the form of the
prosecution and punishment of these individuals will help
Mexico revive its law enforcement and prepare for an un-
tainted future by removing some of the opportunity that
Mexican cartels have to corrupt Mexican officials. Prosecution
in the United States will also ease the workload of Mexican
prosecutors and judges, allowing them to concentrate their ef-
forts on the reduced number of cases in front of them.
The Mexican Executive needs to declare that the power and
violence generated by the cartels create an "exceptional" drug
trafficking problem. Once this fact is acknowledged, the Mexi-
can Executive can justify the expulsion of major drug
traffickers without reforming current laws.
Alternatively, Mexico could amend the 1975 extradition law
and erase the exception for nationals. The Mexican govern-
ment could lower the threshold requirement under which
extradition of nationals is permitted. For example, the
amended Article 14 could read: "A Mexican will be surrendered
to a foreign state when the Executive deems appropriate." By
replacing the phrases, "No Mexican shall,"2 04 and "cases consid-
ered exceptional," 205 with phrases indicating more discretion
and a lower threshold, the Mexican executive will have more
flexibility to authorize extradition.
In order to assuage foreign concerns regarding the
treatment of their nationals in U.S. courts, agreements to
extradite for prosecution can be made subject to limitations
put in place by either state."°' For example, in 1989 and 1990,
Colombia extradited more than two dozen accused Colombian
drug traffickers and money launderers to the United States. 7
Accompanying the Colombian Presidential Decree that
allowed those extraditions were the conditions that no
Colombian national would receive a prison sentence for longer
than thirty years, and that none would be sentenced to
death."0 8 The current extradition treaty between Mexico and
the United States contains a clause that severely limits the
imposition of the death penalty for the punishment of
204. Mexican International Extradition Law, supra note 15, at art. 14.
205. Id.
206. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 772.
207. See NADELMANN, supra note 88, at 433.
208. See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991).
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extraditees.2° Although Mexican courts can impose death
sentences in some cases, the penalty is generally disfavored by
Mexico and has not been employed by that country since
1937.210 An agreement with Mexico to extradite Mexican
nationals could include stronger wording ensuring that no
convicted Mexican would be sentenced to death.
Extradition to the United States should not be a permanent
solution. Mexican sovereignty is at stake. But continued refus-
als to extradite narco-traffickers threaten Mexican sovereignty
as well, and probably to a much greater degree.2" A concession
by Mexican political leaders that prosecutions could be han-
dled better in American courts will require the Mexican
government to swallow its pride. Fears that the United States
is intruding on Mexican sovereignty, similar to the concerns
raised in the wake of the Alvarez-Machain incident,212 will
surely be voiced as soon as a Mexican national is extradited to
the United States. Mexican political leaders will likely suffer
in the Mexican public eye at first, but the strength of political
leaders on both sides of the border will make the difference.
Policy-makers in the United States can make concessions as
well. First, and foremost, U.S. officials need to promise that
they will respect Mexico and its sovereignty. For example, as-
surances that no more kidnappings or irregular renditions of
Mexican citizens will take place and promises to cooperate
fully with Mexican law enforcement, including disclosure of
enforcement activities which affect Mexico, should make Mexi-
can concessions to extradite nationals seem more reciprocal in
nature.
In large measure, the success or failure of the fight against
Mexican drug traffickers depends upon the willingness of
Mexico's political leaders to take the resolute first step. A
commitment by those atop the Mexican political hierarchy will
instill the confidence necessary to achieve long-term gains.
Once Mexico begins to extradite individuals wanted by the
209. See U.S.-Mex. Extradition Treaty, supra note 43, at art. 8. The Treaty states
that when the offense is punishable by death in the requesting state but the laws of
the requested party prohibit capital punishment for the offense, the requested state
can require assurances that the death penalty will not be employed. See id.
210. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILiS ... THE DEATH
PENALTY: A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 176-77 (1989).
211. See discussion supra Part IV.
212. See discussion supra Part III.B. (discussing the anger expressed by Mexico
after the kidnapping of Alvarez-Machian). For a more detailed discussion, including




United States, the control held by the cartels will diminish and
their extravagant lifestyles will end.
Mexico is attempting to improve its anti-drug mechanisms
and may soon be able to combat the narco-traffickers domesti-
cally.213 Once Mexico is able to impart the message that it will
not tolerate drug trafficking and corruption, the prosecution of
these individuals should be handled by its domestic legal sys-
tem. Until then, the prosecution of individuals in the United
States is the best alternative.
213. For example, on March 3, 1998 in Mexico, General Jesus Gutidrrez Rebollo,
the former head of Mexico's anti-drug program, was sentenced to almost 14 years in
prison for weapons violations and abuse of his authority on behalf of the Juarez-based
Amado Carillo Fuentes cartel. See supra Part IV. The conviction and sentence is con-
sidered a big step by Mexico, because Gutidrrez was the highest-ranking Mexican
official to face a narcotics-corruption trial. See Mary Beth Sheridan & Jodi Wilgoren,
Ex-Leader of Mexico's War on Drugs Sentenced, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at Al. Mex-
ico is also making considerable efforts to ensure that the anti-drug program will not
continue to be soiled with corruption. See supra Part IV.
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